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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 25, 1988, the Supreme Court ignited a controversy by an-
nouncing that it would reconsider' its ruling in Runyon v. McCrary,2 a
landmark 1976 civil rights decision, in a case currently before the Court,
* On June 15, 1989, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Patterson v.
McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Although the Court reaffirmed its
ruling in Runyon v. McCrary, it nevertheless limited the application of Section
1981 to the formation of employment contracts. A bill aimed at countering this
holding, as well as several other 1989 decisions that restricted the rights of
plaintiffs in race and sex discrimination cases, is currently before Congress and
may soon become law. While this Note was written prior to the Patterson decision,
the analysis remains relevant for statutory construction of both Section 1981 and
any future legislation passed.
I Supreme Court Order Scheduling Reargument of Civil Rights Case, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 80 at D-1 (Apr. 26, 1988).
2427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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Patterson v. McClean Credit Union.3 Runyon affirmed the right of certain
minority groups to sue private entities for unlawful discrimination under
42 U.S.C. Section 1981. 4 The decision largely settled the debate over
whether laws enacted after the Civil War protected blacks from discrim-
ination by private parties.5 Following the Court's 5-4 vote to schedule
reargument, 6 an unprecedented number of amicus briefs were filed, the
majority of which urged the Court to reaffirm Runyon.7
Patterson calls into question the origin of the present Section 1981.'
Even if the justices decide not to overturn Runyon, they still must decide
whether Section 1981 reaches racial harassment in the workplace.9 Also
raised as issues are the importance of the need for stability in the law
and the potentially adverse impact on national civil rights policy of re-
consideration and possible reversal of the Runyon case. 0
This Note discusses the elements of the controversy unleashed by the
Court: the origin and operation of the present Section 1981 and its relation
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended" [hereinafter
Title VII]. In addition, the Note treats the legal doctrines of state action
and stare decisis with respect to Runyon and its progeny addressing
employment discrimination. The Note concludes that reversal of Runyon
could substantially unsettle American law and set national civil rights
policy on a course back to the future.
II. SECTION 1981: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
A. Historical Background
During the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War, Congress
passed several civil rights statutes designed to give force to the newly
3 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
4 Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to
no other.
42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (1982).
5 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1988, at 44.
6 Oral argument was heard on October 12, 1988. See 57 U.S.L.W. 3292 (Oct.
25, 1988).
7A.B.A. J., supra note 5, at 44.
'Patterson's attorneys held that Section 1981 dated from 1866, as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. On the other hand, the employer's attorney argued that
Congress repealed the part of the 1866 Act that contained language resembling
the present Section 1981 when it recodified the federal statutes in 1874, and the
present Section 1981 is a recodification of a provision of the 1870 Enforcement
Act. U.S.L.W., supra note 6, at 3292.
9Id.
10 See Reidinger, Runyon Under the Gun, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1988, at 78.
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
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ratified thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. 2 Obviously,
these laws were not enacted in anticipation of the modern problems of
employment discrimination. 13 Because the derivation of Section 1981 con-
tinues to generate controversy in the Supreme Court, its history must be
carefully detailed. 4
Section 1981 was originally enacted as Section 11" of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.16 The 1866 Act was passed pursuant to the power of Congress
to eradicate slavery, as expressed in the thirteenth amendment, which
had been ratified in 1865. The statute was re-enacted as the Enforcement
Act of 1870,'17 after ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, in
order to eliminate any doubt that Congress had the constitutional au-
thority to pass such legislation. Section 1 of the Enforcement Act simply
re-enacted Section 1 of the 1866 Act, whereas Section 16, a second and
new section, contained wording almost identical to the present Section
1981.18 Federal statutory law was codified in 1874; Section 1977 of the
Revised Code of 1874 is identical to the present Section 1981.19
The origin of Section 1981 forms the crux of the reconsideration of
Runyon and could well form the basis of its reversal. The Runyon majority
subscribed to the position that Section 1981 is derived from the 1866 Act
as well as the 1870 Act.2 0 The Court therefore ruled that Section 1981
validly reached private, in addition to public, racial discrimination based
upon Congress' thirteenth amendment power. However, Justice White,
joined by Justice Rehnquist in his Runyon dissent, asserted that Section
18 of the 1870 Act (Section 1 of the 1866 Act) was eliminated in the 1874
codification, and Section 1981 is based solely on the new, second section
of the 1870 Act, Section 16.21 Consequently, in his view, Section 1981 is
based exclusively on the fourteenth amendment and is limited to situa-
tions involving state action.
12 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 668-97 (2nd
ed. 1983). See also Reiss, Requiem for an "Independent Remedy": The Civil Rights
Acts of 1866 and 1871 as Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 50 S. CAL.
L. REV. 961, 963 (1977).
13 Reiss, supra note 12, at 963.
', Id. at 971 n.48. See generally Note, The Expanding Scope of Section 1981:
Assault on Private Discrimination and a Cloud on Affirmative Action, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 412 (1976); Larsen, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for
Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 56 (1972).
1" The original version of Section 1 protected both contractual and property
rights from discrimination. This version was later recodified into two statutes.
Today Section 1981 applies to contractual rights, while Section 1982 applies to
property rights. Note, National Origin Discrimination under Section 1981, 51
FORDHAM L. REV. 919, 919 n.1 (1983).
"Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 144. It is also called the
Voting Rights Act of 1870.
Reiss, supra note 12, at 971 n.48.
"Id.
20427 U.S. 160, 168 n.8 (1976).
2'Id. at 195-205. For further discussion of Runyon, see infra Part I1.
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B. Scope and Coverage
1. Type of Employer
a. Private Employers
Although Section 1981 appears to prohibit a broad range of private and
public discriminatory actions, the statute has been narrowly interpreted
for most of its history.22 In 1883, the Supreme Court struck down legis-
lation forbidding discrimination in public accommodation, ruling that
Congress did not have the power under either the thirteenth or the four-
teenth amendment to reach purely private acts of discrimination. 23 Al-
though Section 1981 was not directly involved in that case, the Court
announced that Section 1981 should be restricted to situations involving
"state action. 2 4 As recently as 1948, the Court expressly required "gov-
ernmental action" in a suit based on the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
1870.25
More than one hundred years after passage of the statute, the Supreme
Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,26 finally dispensed with the state
action requirement and held that the 1866 Act reached wholly private
acts of discrimination. 7 The Court reasoned that when Congress included
the word "custom" in Section 1 of the 1866 Act, it plainly meant to protect
the rights guaranteed therein against interference from any source, pri-
vate or governmental." Jones concerned the application of Section 1982,
the companion statute of Section 1981,29 so its logic was soon applied to
Section 1981.30
After Jones, a number of cases were filed under Section 1981, alleging
that employment discrimination in the private sector constituted a vio-
lation of the statute. In each case, the courts of appeals upheld Section
1981 as affording a remedy for private acts of employment discrimination
based on race.3' Moreover, courts of appeals and district courts held Sec-
22 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 669; Reiss, supra note 12, at
973.
3The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
2Id. at 16.
25 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948).
26 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 669; Reiss, supra note 12, at
973.
392 U.S. at 423-24.
2See supra note 15 for a discussion of the common derivation of Section 1981
and Section 1982.
-" B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 669; Reiss, supra note 12, at
973.
-1 Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston
County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982
(1972); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757
(3rd Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d
476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
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tion 1981 applicable to discrimination by labor unions.31 Finally, in the
landmark case of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,33 the Supreme
Court espoused a similar view: "[I]t is now well settled among the federal
courts of appeals-and we now join them-that Section 1981 affords a
federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis
of race."
34
b. Public Employers
For most of its early history, Section 1981 was interpreted to apply
exclusively to public discrimination involving governmental action.3 5
However, in Brown v. General Service Administration,'3 the Supreme
Court decided that Section 717 of Title VII provides the exclusive remedy
for federal employees who claim to have suffered unlawful discrimination.
This has all but eliminated the use of Section 1981 against federal de-
fendants. Section 1981 may only be used in those few cases where dis-
crimination in federal employment is not covered by Title VIIA7 The Fifth
and Eighth Circuits are divided on the question of whether the Brown
exclusivity of remedy principle means that unions, which do not come
within Section 717(a), may not be sued under Section 1981.38
Section 1981 covers local governmental entities and officials.39 How-
ever, it appears that state governmental entities are protected by sov-
ereign immunity under the eleventh amendment.
4
2. Bases of Discrimination
a. Race
Because Section 1981 was a direct response to the liberation of the
slaves, the statute clearly proscribes racial discrimination in the making
32 See, e.g., Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Allen v. Butz, 390 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Henry v. Radio Station KSAN,
374 F. Supp. 260 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
421 U.S. 454 (1975).
1 Id. at 459-60.
Reiss, supra note 12, at 975 n.69.
36 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
31 Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (since Title VII does
not cover uniformed military personnel, Section 1981 could be used), affd sub
nom. Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986
(1978). For a discussion of which government personnel are not covered by Section
717, see generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 1188 n.18.
Jennings v. American Postal Workers Union, Local 8, 672 F.2d 712 (8th Cir.
1982) (exclusivity of remedy under Title VII does not preclude action under Section
1981 against union representing federal employees); Newbold v. U.S. Postal Serv-
ice, 614 F.2d 46 (5th Cir.) (exclusivity of remedy under Title VII means that labor
organizations representing federal employees may not be sued under Section 1981
even though not covered by Section 717), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 878 (1980).
39 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 674.
4o Id.
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and enforcement of employment and union contracts.4 1 It protects not
only black persons but broadly prohibits all racial discrimination in con-
tracts. Accordingly, whites are offered the same standard of protection
under Section 1981 as are blacks.42 Cases of "reverse discrimination," in
which white employees claim to be the direct victims of policies and
practices favoring nonwhites, comprise one category of claims filed by
whites under Section 1981. 43
A second category includes situations where whites experience dis-
crimination because of their association with blacks.44 In this category,
at least one court permitted whites to sue under Section 1981 when they
were the direct objects of discrimination due to their dealings with
blacks.4 5 In a third category of cases, courts have sometimes denied stand-
ing to whites who sued under Section 1981 where they were not the
immediate victims of discrimination, but sought rather to challenge prac-
tices that allegedly discriminated against blacks.46
b. Gender
It is now widely accepted that Section 1981 does not cover discrimi-
nation based on gender.47 The overwhelming weight of authority, from
Runyon48 to St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,49 states so. Nevertheless,
the fact that Section 1981 does not address sex discrimination should be
clarified: black women are definitely protected when they assert claims
based on race,50 while black men are not covered when they file suits
based on sex.
51
It is worth noting that even the modern Title VII, when proposed, did
not include sex discrimination. This basis was added by amendment dur-
ing floor debate in the House, probably to prevent passage of the bill. 52
41 M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 8.02 (1988).
42 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
41 Reiss, supra note 12, at 985.
44Id.
41 DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306 (2nd Cir. 1975) (white dis-
charged for selling his home to a black had a claim cognizable under Section
1981).
"National Org. for Women v. Bank of Cal., 680 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982).Contra Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 915 (1977).
47 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 674.
48 427 U.S. at 167 (Section 1981 does not address discrimination based on
religion or sex).
"481 U.S. 604 (1987).
'0 Black women have brought hundreds of suits under Section 1981. One inparticular, Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972), was sub-
sequently cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Railway Ex-press Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 n.6 (1975).
51 Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (court
rejected portion of plaintiffs complaint alleging refusal to hire due to sex), affd,
569 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1978).
52 C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115-18 (1985).
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It is highly unlikely that, a century earlier, Congress intended to erad-
icate sex discrimination under the thirteenth amendment.
53
c. Religion
In general, Section 1981 will not support claims based on religion be-
cause religious discrimination is not a type of discrimination based on
race or color.54 When lower federal courts utilized a quasi-scientific dis-
tinction based on "race" (Negroid, Caucasoid, and Mongoloid), plaintiffs
received protection only if they alleged discrimination due to membership
in one of the races (i.e., Caucasian favored over Chinese, claim sus-
tained).55
Subsequently, the Supreme Court broadened and refined the definition
of "race" discrimination to such an extent that certain instances of reli-
gious discrimination came within Section 1981.56 The Court reasoned:
"Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of
persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of
their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is racial
discrimination that Congress intended Section 1981 to forbid, whether
or not it would be classified as racial in terms of modern scientific the-
ory. '57 Thus, plaintiffs who establish intentional discrimination because
they are Arabs, Orientals, or Jews (peoplehood), rather than solely be-
cause they are Moslems, Buddhists, or Jews (believers), meet the Court's
criteria and would likely prevail under Section 1981.58
d. Alienage and National Origin
Despite the Supreme Court's description of the rights protected as ra-
cial, the Court has extended Section 1981 to apply to aliens. 59 The deci-
sions do not specify whether aliens can assert a claim of alienage-based
-Reiss, supra note 12, at 987.
"B. SCHLEI & P. GROsSMAN, supra note 12, at 677.
15 M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 613.56 1d.
17 St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 605 (1987).
18 Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987), applied the ra-
tionale of St. Francis College to a claim under Section 1982 and ruled that the
statute proscribes discrimination against Jews. Jews would probably be protected
as a "race" under Section 1981, too. But see Wald v. Local 357, International Bwd.
of Teamsters, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) Para. 31,497 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (Jews are
not protected under Section 1981).
19 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 applied only to "citizens" of the United States.
The Enforcement Act of 1870 changed the language to "all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States." Kaufman, A Race by Any Other Name: The
Interplay between Ethnicity, National Origin and Race for Purposes of Section
1981, 28 ARIZ. L. REv. 259, 271 (1986).
1990]
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discrimination or are limited to claims of racial discrimination. 60 Until
recently, the Fifth Circuit held that Section 1981 prohibited employment
discrimination against Mexican-American aliens based on their lack of
citizenship. 1 It would be probable that the more closely alienage can be
linked to "identifiable" ethnicity or ancestry, the stronger a claim under
Section 1981.
The majority of courts have held that national origin is not per se
covered by Section 1981.62 But again, the overwhelming majority of courts
allow persons of differing national origins to proceed if they allege dis-
crimination because they are "non-white."6 3
e. Other Bases
Section 1981 protects against retaliation for filing a claim under it or
other statutes, such as Title VII, that forbid race discrimination.6 Even
if the allegation of racial discrimination lacks merit, the employer who
acts against the employee for filing suit violates Section 1981.65
Section 1981 does not maintain causes of action for age discrimination.66
Section 1981 is applicable to harms involving hiring, promotion, and
discharge. 67 As mentioned, Patterson raises the issue of whether harass-
ment of a current employee because of race states a claim under Section
1981.68 Since Section 1981 guarantees the making and enforcement of
contracts as enjoyed by white citizens, working condition discrimination
based upon race, including wage differences, should come within the scope
of the statute.
6 9
C. Procedures, Standards, and Remedies
1. Procedural Aspects
Federal jurisdiction over Section 1981 claims now derives from 28
60 Note, supra note 15, at 922.
"I Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 653-54 (5th Cir. 1974),
overruled, Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.
1987).
62 See Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. and Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1981)
(discrimination against East Indian Caucasian not racial). But see Manzanares
v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979) (discrimination against
Hispanics is racial because of distinct combination of racial groups that compose
Hispanic culture).
B_ SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 676.
M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 615.
65 
Id.
r Kodish v. United Air Lines, Inc., 628 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1981).
6 M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 615.
- 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff was not denied the right to enter a
contract, so no cause of action).
69 M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 615.
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U.S.C. Section 1342(4),70 which grants original jurisdiction without re-
gard to the amount in controversy. 71 Although Section 1981 initially pro-
vided for federal jurisdiction "exclusively of the courts of the several
states,' 72 the restriction on state court jurisdiction has been omitted, so
it is unclear whether state courts would have concurrent jurisdiction. 73
Section 1981 contains no statute of limitations,
74 and there is no spe-
cifically stated federal statute of limitations for claims arising under the
Reconstruction Era civil rights laws.7 5 Therefore, the controlling statute
of limitations is determined by the most analogous state law.
7 6 Courts
have used a state statute of limitations for actions based upon a liability
created by statute,77 for contract actions, 78 tort actions,
79 actions for civil
rights damages,80 or the state's catchall statute of limitations.
8
'
The state statute of limitations for bringing suit under Section 1981 is
not tolled by filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, charging the defendant with the same alleged discrimina-
tory act.
2
Because actions under Section 1981 are considered actions at law to
remedy a civil harm, a plaintiff who seeks damages, as opposed to purely
equitable relief, has a right to a trial by jury. 3 The demand for a jury
trial must be timely.
8 4
There are no administrative prerequisites to suit under Section 1981.85
The defendant does not have to meet a statutory definition of "employer"
or "labor organization": the person who makes the employment decision
incurs liability. 6 There is no minimum size requirement for coverage,
nor is a connection to interstate commerce xhandated
8 7
70 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1982) provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person
to recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress
providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote."
7, B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 691-92.
72 Act of April 9, 1866, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
71 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 692.
74 M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 617.
71 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 692.
76 M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 617.
77 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(1) (West 1954).
,8Tramble v. Converters Ink Co., 343 F. Supp. 1350, 1354 (D. Ill. 1972).
79 Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 309 (W.D.
Tenn. 1974).
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
81 Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 383 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
82 M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 618.
9Id. at 618.
4 Harris v. Richards Mfg. Co., Inc., 675 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982).
s B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMSAN, supra note 12, at 693.
86 M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 615.
87 /d.
1990]
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
2. Standards of Proof
The language of Section 1981 does not address motive; it does not create
absolute liability, nor does it premise liability upon the impact of em-
ployment decisions. 88 For years, courts regarded the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and Title VII as analogous and applied the statutory principles of
Title VII, which does not require proof of discriminatory intent or purpose,
to Section 1981 claims.89
However, the Supreme Court held in a recent decision90 that Section
1981 reaches only purposeful discrimination, and consequently, distinc-
tions which are neutral on their face but adversely affect a protected class
do not violate the law.91
Courts have decided that Section 1981 violations may be established
under standards developed for Title VII.92 The model of proving individual
disparate treatment announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green9" is
appropriate. A plaintiff can show a prima facie case of discriminatory
motivation by establishing that he/she was a member of a protected class,
sought a position for which the defendant was seeking applicants, was
qualified for the vacant position, and was rejected while the employer
continued to seek other applicants. These elements create an initial in-
ference of improper motivation which shifts to the employer the burden
of articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
action. If the defendant fails to provide a reason, the plaintiff prevails;
if the defendant produces one, the plaintiff must then introduce evidence
that the reason was a pretext to disguise illegal intent in order to prevail.94
Additionally, illegal intent can be demonstrated by the use of statis-
tics. s5 If the plaintiff can generate data eliminating chance as the cause
of the adverse impact, the burden of proof will shift to the defendant to
successfully challenge the plaintiff's statistical showing or to provide a
legitimate explanation for the observed result. 96 Of course, because the
court has rejected liability based on adverse impact, objective selection
criteria, such as tests and credentials, are analyzed only as to motivation
for their use.97
88 Id. at 616.
- B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 694. See, e.g., Davis v. County
of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 440 U.S.625 (1979). See generally Note, Section 1981: Discriminatory Purpose or Dispro-
portionate Impact?, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 137 (1980).90 General Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389(1982).
91 Section 1981 requires only that decisions be premised on race and not oninvidious hostility. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
92 M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 616.
93 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 616-17. However, if a plaintiff has direct evi-dence of discriminatory intent, the defendant must then show that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not considered the prohibited factor. Id.95 Id. at 617.
See Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No. 30, 694 F.2d
531 (9th Cir. 1982).
97 M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 617.
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3. Remedies
The Supreme Court has held that an individual who establishes a cause
of action under Section 1981 is entitled to equitable as well as legal relief,
including compensatory and, in some circumstances, punitive damages.
98
A successful plaintiff might receive the job illegally denied and back
wages, and recover for consequential loss, such as loss of credit and job
opportunities, and for personal injuries such as pain, suffering, and hu-
miliation.9 9 In cases of proven malicious or wanton misconduct, a discri-
minatee may recover punitive damages against those responsible for the
harm, with the exception of state'00 and municipal entities.
10 1
D. Relation to Title VII
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a com-
prehensive federal fair employment statute.10 2 In 1972, Congress sub-
stantially enlarged the coverage of Title VII, making it applicable for the
first time to federal, state, and local governmental bodies in addition to
a broader range of private parties.10 3 The 1964 Act also created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter the Commission or
E.E.O.C.], which may investigate and conciliate charges of discrimination
or institute civil actions on behalf of discriminatees
10 4 and "pattern and
practice" suits where appropriate. 10 The Commission has promulgated
procedural regulations and substantive guidelines which furnish a de-
tailed source of employment discrimination law.
10 6
91 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
s B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 695-96; M. PLAYER, supra note
41, at 618.
100 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 695.
'0' M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 618. See infra p. 4 for a discussion on the
applicability of Section 1981 to public employers.
102 Reiss, supra note 12, at 961.
10, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86
Stat. 103,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). "Governments, governmental agen-
cies, and political subdivisions" were included within the definition of "persons"
in § 701(a). Sections 701(b) and 701(e) extended the Act's coverage to employers
and unions of 15 or more employees and members, respectively. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b) & (e) (1982). The exemption from coverage of nonreligious educational
institutions was removed from Section 702. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. A separate
provision of the Act, § 717, prohibited discrimination based on the specified bases
against employees of the federal government, which was not defined as a covered
employer in Section 701(b). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1982).
1o6 Section 713 of the 1964 Act authorizes the Commission to promulgate pro-
cedural rules and regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1982). E.E.O.C. regulations
are set forth at 29 C.F.R. § 1601 (1985). The Commission has also promulgated
substantive guidelines, although the Act does not specifically confer such au-
thority upon it, but courts have accorded them "great deference" in many cases.
Reiss, supra note 12, at 962 n.12. See 29 C.F.R. § 1602 (1985) (records and reports);
29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1985) (sex discrimination guidelines); 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1985)
(religious discrimination guidelines); 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1985) (national origin
guidelines); and 29 C.F.R. § 1625 (1985) (age discrimination guidelines).
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Title VII proscribes discrimination based upon race, color, sex, religion
and national origin.10 7 The Act further prohibits retaliation against per-
sons who oppose discriminatory practices, who file charges, or who par-
ticipate in any proceedings under the Act. 0 8 Title VII covers employers,
unions, employment agencies, and joint labor-management committees,
and applies to virtually every employment practice: recruitment, hiring,job assignments, promotions, transfers, benefits, other terms and condi-
tions of employment, layoffs, discharges, and harassment and intimida-
tion. 0 9
Coverage under Title VII extends as far as Congress can reach under
its power to regulate interstate commerce.110 However, unlike Section
1981, Title VII is fraught with numerous jurisdictional and procedural
requirements, including minimum defendant size, 1 employer-employee
relationship,112 timeliness, 113 Commission processing,14 and receipt of a
notice of the right to sue. 15 Generally, discrimination charges have beenprocessed by the Commission on a first-come, first-served basis; however,
a backlog accumulated in the first decade of the statute's existence and
newly filed charges often had to wait several years for administrative
processing to commence. 116 Although the time required for processing a
Title VII charge has since decreased,117 a very small percentage of charges
closed with a reasonable cause determination.118
Despite the comprehensive and complex procedural scheme of Title VII,
the Supreme Court has ruled that the statute itself expressly preserved
alternative and parallel remedies." 9 Current practice often has a plaintiff
in a race discrimination case joining Title VII and Section 1981 claims.120
107 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-2(a) to 2(d) (1982).
08 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982).
109 Reiss, supra note 12, at 961 n.8.
I0 M. LEVIN-EPsTEIN, PRIMER OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 13 (4th ed.
1987).
M See supra note 103. However, a state or local fair employment practices
agency may have a lower minimum size requirement and be able to reach the
employer when E.E.O.C. has no iurisdiction.
112 "[N]umerous courts have held that Title VII does not apply to discriminationinvolving an actual or potential independent contractor relationship." B. SCHLEI
& P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 997.11 There is a 180/300-day charge-filing period and a 90-day suit-filing period.
Id. at 1015.
114 This may include a fact-finding conference, an investigation, a plant tour,
and, if there is reasonable cause to believe the law has been violated, conciliation.Id. at 933-82. Furthermore, in deferral jurisdictions, the same procedures maybe followed by a state or local fair employment practices agency before E.E.O.C.
begins its case processing. Id. at 941-42.
115 A discriminatee may not file in court under Title VII unless a charge is firstfiled with the Commission and statutory notice of right to sue is issued. Id. at
967.116 d. at 939 n. 54.
1 Id. at 938 n.52.
Id. at 950 n. 144.
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).120 M. PLAYER, supra note 41, at 619.
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Benefits of this strategy include the ability to survive any procedural
failures in the Title VII case and the availability under Section 1981 but
not Title VII of compensatory and punitive damages.' 2'
III. RUNYON AND ITS PROGENY
A. Runyon v. McCrary
In Runyon, the parents of black children who were refused admission
to several private schools because the schools were not integrated and
accepted only "members of the caucasian race" sued under Section 1981.122
The district court held that the schools' racially discriminatory admis-
sions policy violated Section 1981, enjoined the schools' 23 from discrim-
inating against applicants on the basis of race, awarded compensatory
damages to the plaintiffs, and assessed attorneys' fees against each
school.'
24
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of equitable and compensatory relief, but reversed its award of
attorneys' fees. 2 5 The court agreed that Section 1981 is a "limitation upon
private discrimination,"1 26 and further rejected the schools' assertion that
their racially discriminatory policies are shielded by a constitutional right
of privacy or of freedom of association.127
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appeals court, holding
that Section 1981 prohibits private, commercially operated, non-sectarian
schools from denying admission to prospective students because they are
black, and that Section 1981 is constitutional as so applied. 128 In arriving
at its decision on the reach of the statute, the Court examined the powers
granted to the commissioners who prepared the draft of the 1874 codifi-
cation of federal statutory law. The Court reasoned that the commission-
ers did not intend to recommend to Congress that any portion of Section
1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 be repealed upon the enactment of the
121 Id. Title VII empowers the courts to fashion equitable relief, which empha-
sizes "making whole" victims of discrimination and eradicating discriminatory
practices. Id. at 436.
112 The schools, Bobbe's School and the Fairfax-Brewster School, mailed bro-
chures addressed "resident" and advertised in the "Yellow Pages" of the telephone
directory. 427 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1976).
123 This included the Southern Independent School Association, which had
sought and been granted permission to intervene as a party defendant against
the Runyons, the proprietors of Bobbe's School. The organization is a nonprofit
association of six state private school associations, representing 395 private
schools, many of which denied admission to blacks. Id.
1" Gonzales v. Fairfax Brewster School, 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973),
affd in part, rev'd in part; McCray v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), afd
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
125 The appellate court also upheld an earlier ruling of the district court that
Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, applied to
Section 1981 suits filed in that state, barred the damages claim of one set of
parents. McCray v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975, affd 427 U.S. 160
(1960).
126 515 F.2d 1082, 1086 (1975).
1Id. at 1086, 1088.
128 427 U.S. at 186.
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1874 revision because they had the authority1 29 to designate which stat-
utes or parts of statutes ought to be repealed and explain their reasons
for such repeal, but did not indicate a recommended change for the future
Section 1981.130 The Court noted that in past decisions it had expressed
the view that Section 16 of the 1870 Act was a reenactment of certain
language in Section 1 of the 1866 Act,1 3 ' and that Section 1981 reached
private employment contracts. 13 2 The Court concluded that there is no
basis for inferring that Congress did not understand the draft legislation
which became Section 1981 to be drawn from both Section 1 of the 1866
Act and Section 16 of the 1870 Act; to hold otherwise would contradict
Congress' delineation of the revision/repeal procedures and conflict with
a previous decision. 3 3 As a further indication of congressional agreement
that Section 1981 reaches private acts of racial discrimination, the Court
noted that Congress specifically considered and rejected an amendment 34
to Title VII which would have repealed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as
a basis for private-sector discrimination suits.'
With regard to the constitutionality of Section 1981 as applied, the
Court determined that the right of freedom of association and the right
of privacy were not violated.136 While parents may have a first amendment
right to send their children to schools that support the belief that racial
segregation is desirable, "it does not follow that the practice of excluding
racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same
principle."' 137 With respect to the right of privacy, "it does not follow that
because government is largely or even entirely precluded from regulating
the child-bearing decision, it is similarly restricted by the Constitution
from regulating the implementation of parental decisions concerning a
child's education."'' 3 Section 1981, as applied to racial discrimination that
interferes with the making and enforcement of contracts for private ed-
129 The commissioners were appointed pursuant to the Act of June 27, 1866,
14 Stat. 74, re-enacted by the Act of May 4, 1870, c.72, 16 Stat. 96, and given
authority to revise, simplify, and consolidate all statutes dealing with similar
subjects. Id. at 168 n.8. Under Section 3 of the Act of June 27, 1866, they were
to designate such statutes or parts of statutes that, in their judgment, ought to
be repealed, with their reasons for such repeal. Id.
1
30 Id.
13, Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 790-91 (1966).
132 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
427 U.S. at 168 n.8.
Senator Hruska proposed an amendment which would have made Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act the sole sources of federal relief for employment discrim-
ination. 118 CONG. REC. 3371 (1972). The Senate, however, was persuaded by
Senator Williams to not repeal "the first major piece of civil rights legislation in
this Nation's history" and rejected the proposed amendment. Id. at 3372-73. See
generally Note, Is Section 1981 Modified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964?, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1223 (Title VII complements Section 1981).
131 427 U.S. at 174.
,
36 Id. at 175. The Court also declared that Section 1981 as applied did not
violate a parent's right to direct the education of his children. Id.
131 Id. at 176.
138 Id. at 178.
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ucation, constitutes an exercise of federal legislative power under Section
2 of the thirteenth amendment, 139 and promotes goals closely analogous
to those served by Section 1981's eradication of racial discrimination in
the making of private employment contracts. 140
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented in Runyon. First,
Justice White argued that the right to contract conferred by Section 1981
means only that nonwhites, as well as whites, cannot be precluded from
entering into contracts with willing parties.14 1 Section 1981 would thus
invalidate any state statute or court-made rule which would disable
blacks or any other class of persons from making or enforcing contracts;
it would not prohibit a defendant's refusal to deal with any individual,
on the basis of race or for any other reason.
142
Second, Justice White contended that the legislative history of Section
1981 confirmed that the statute prohibits any legal rule disabling any
person from making or enforcing a contract, but does not proscribe private
racially motivated refusals to contract.14 3 In particular, he noted that the
revisers' notes to the 1874 codification of federal statutes clearly designate
Section 16 of the 1870 Act as the source for Section 1977 (the present
Section 1981).144 Since the 1870 Act was passed pursuant to Congress'
fourteenth amendment power, 145 Section 16 was designed to require equal
treatment under the law and not by private individuals.146 Also, the 1870
Act was partly intended to protect Chinese aliens, 47 who were plainly
not covered by Section 1 of the 1866 Act.148 Finally, in response to the
majority opinion that Section 1981 derived from both the 1866 Act and
the 1870 Act, Justice White asserted that Congress repealed the contract
rights part149 of Section 1 of the 1866 Act in 1874, by Section 5596 of the
Revised Statutes. 150
9 Id. at 179. "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
140 427 U.S. at 179.
141 Id. at 194 (White, J., dissenting). Assent has always been central to the
concept of a contract; whites have no right to contract with an unwilling private
person, no matter what that person's motivation for refusing to bargain.
142Id.
143 Id. at 195.
1
" Id. at 195 n.6.
1, "[N]or shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
146 427 U.S. at 202 (White, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 200.
148 Id. at 202. The 1866 Act applied only to citizens.
141 The property rights portion of Section 1 of the 1866 Act was codified as
Section 1978 of the Revised Statutes (the current 42 U.S.C. Section 1982). Id. at
207 n.12. See supra note 15.
110 427 U.S. at 207. "All acts of Congress passed prior to said first day of
December one thousand eight hundred and seventy-three, any portion of which
is embraced in any section of said revision, are hereby repealed, and the section
applicable thereto shall be in force in lieu thereof." Id. (quoting in part Section
5596 of the Revised Statutes).
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Although Justice Stevens attributed to the legislative history of Section
1981 an intent only to guarantee all citizens the same legal capacity to
make and enforce contracts,15' he nevertheless concurred with the ma-
jority in the interest of stability and orderly development of the law.15 2
Justice Stevens felt that Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., on which Runyon
rests, had been wrongly decided, but declined to overrule it since it reflects
the prevailing mores and current national policy."53 Moreover, "the labor
of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past
decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own
course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others
who had gone before him."'154 Justice Powell concurred with the majority
on the strength of Jones, but added that if the slate were clean, he might
be inclined to agree with Justice White that Section 1981 was not intended
to restrict private contractual choices. 155 Thus, with two members of the
majority expressing doubt that the opinion's rationale was sound, Runyon
was a closer decision than the 7-2 vote might indicate. 5 6
B. Reliance on Runyon
Cases decided in the years following Runyon often relied upon it as
establishing or confirming that Section 1981 reaches acts of private dis-
crimination. 5 7 Several decisions reiterated the legislative history of the
statute as delineated in the majority opinion.158 One case'5 9 cited Runyon
as holding that Title VII had not repealed earlier civil rights legislation.160
151 Id. at 189 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 190.
153 Id.
14 Id. (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921)).
115 Id. at 186.
116 Reidinger, supra note 10, at 79.
1,7 E.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285 (1976)(Section 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employ-
ment on the basis of race); Roebuck v. Drexel University, 852 F.2d 715, 725 (3rd
Cir. 1988) (Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination by private schools); Davis
v. United States Steel Supply, Division of United States Steel Corp., 688 F.2d
166, 174 n.10 (3rd Cir. 1982) (application of Section 1981 to actions by private
parties), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 1014 (1983); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist.,
545 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1976) (federal liability imposed upon private ent-
ities); Partin v. St. Johnsbury Co., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1297, 1300 (D.R.I. 1978)(Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of
private contracts); Lora v. Board of Ed. of City of New York, 456 F. Supp. 1211,
1280 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Section 1981 forbids discrimination even in private schools).
",8 McDonald, 427 U.S. at 286; Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 808
F.2d 1082, 1089 (5th Cir.), affd, 829 F.2d 1343, 1345 (5th Cir. 1987); Ortiz v.
Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 554 n.5 (E.D. Cal. 1982); Vasquez v. Werner
Continental, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 513, 515 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
159 Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,376 (1979).
10 "[T]he later statutes cannot be said to have impliedly repealed the earlier
unless there is an irreconcilable conflict between them." Id. at 391.
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Runyon has served as the definitive source that Section 1981 does not
cover claims of sex discrimination. 161 Several courts employed it to dismiss
Section 1981 suits alleging discrimination based upon national origin,'16 2
although others interpreted it more generally as authorizing only claims
of "racial" discrimination. 13 On occasion, courts noted that Runyon also
eliminates religion as a Section 1981 basis of discrimination.'6
A few cases referred to Runyon in acknowledging the propriety of com-
pensatory damages in Section 1981 actions. 16 . Others relied on Runyon
to uphold application of state and local statutes of limitation to Section
1981 claims.166
161 See, e.g., Movement for Opportunity and Equality v. General Motors Corp.,
622 F.2d 1235, 1239 n.1 (7th Cir. 1980); Bobo v. ITT, Continental Baking Co., 662
F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 933 (1982); Smith v. Laborers
Int'l Union of Norristown, Local 135, No. 87-2187 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 1987) (WES-
TLAW, Allfeds Databases, DCTU); Schirmer v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 86-3533
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds Databases, DCTU); Williams v. Ohio
Bell Tel. Co., 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) Para. 31,947 (N.D. Ohio 1981); Weisbord
v. Michigan State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1347, 1354 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Huggler v.
Elkins Stroud Suplee & Co., 505 F. Supp. 9, 10 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Hart v. University
of Tex. at Houston, 474 F. Supp. 465, 466 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Vanguard Justice
Soc'y, Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 675 (D. Md. 1979); Saad v. Burns Int'l
Sec. Servs., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 1978).
162 See Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 534 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982);
Banker v. Time Chem., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
163 Leon v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 823 F.2d 928, 931 (6th Cir. 1987)
(Section 1981 redresses only racial discrimination); Irby v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d
1418, 1430 n.22 (5th Cir. 1984) (race or other "non-white" status); Stones v. Los
Angeles Community College Dist., 572 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(Section 1981 is limited to a prohibition of racial discrimination), affd, 796 F.2d
270 (9th Cir. 1986); Foreman v. General Motors Corp., 473 F. Supp. 166, 177
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (racial discrimination and only racial discrimination pros-
cribed); Apodaca v. General Electric Co., 445 F. Supp. 821, 823 (D.N.M. 1978)
(Section 1981 protects all racial groups that have been victims of racial discrim-
ination).
16 E.g. Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1979);
Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 557 n.10 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
165 Garner v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978); Patton v. Dumpson,
498 F. Supp. 933, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co.,
27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 631 (S.D. Ga. 1979).
16 Movement for Opportunity and Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d
1235 (7th Cir. 1980) (two-year Indiana tort statute of limitations applied); Lay
v. Bethlehem Steel and Social Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 9 (D. Md. 1982) (Maryland
statute applied); McGill v. General Electr. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Md. 1981)
(six-month Maryland statute most analogous); Black Grievance Committee v.
Philadelphia Electr. Co., 79 F.R.D. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Pennsylvania's two-year
statute of limitations applicable to tort cases, rather than six-year statute for
contract cases, applied); Partin v. St. Johnsbury Co., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1297 (D.R.I.
1978) (Rhode Island three-year limitation period applicable to Section 1981 ac-
tions). Contra Shelton v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 434 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(Pennsylvania general statute of limitations does not bar suit).
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C. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union
Brenda Patterson began employment as a teller and file coordinator
for the McClean Credit Union on May 5, 1972.167 She was still a file clerk
in 1982 when she was permanently laid off, after denials of raises and
promotion. Her allegations against the defendant included charges of
racial harassment.168 Patterson received a notice of right to sue from the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on July 5, 1983, and filed
suit on January 25, 1984.169 Because the 90-day statute of limitations 170
had expired on her Title VII claim, she framed her suit as a violation of
her right to enjoy her employment contract as protected by Section 1981
and Runyon.'7'
A week-long jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina in November of 1985 ended in the dismissal of Pat-
terson's entire case.1 72 The court ruled that a claim for racial harassment
is not cognizable under Section 1981, and instructed the jury that Pat-
terson had to show that she was better qualified than the white employee
promoted over her in order to prevail on that count. 78 The jury found
against Patterson. 74
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The court termed Section
1981 a narrower prohibition of discrimination 175 and ruled that racial
harassment affected the terms and conditions of employment, rather than
the right to make and enforce employment contracts, and therefore did
not violate the rights protected by Section 1981 and Runyon. 176
The Supreme Court granted review on October 5, 1987, in order to
consider whether Runyon should be extended to bar racial harassment
and discriminatory promotion. 177 The Court heard argument on February
29, 1988,178 but ignited a controversy less than two months later when it
'c, Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986).
161 Id. at 1146. She contended, for instance, that her boss made her sweep the
office, while white file clerks were not required to do this, stared at her to such
extent that she was distracted from her job, publicly criticized her work, and
made racist comments. Reidinger, supra note 10, at 78.
161 Id. at 79.
170 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982). Thus, Patterson is a classic example of§ 1981
overcoming a procedural pitfall of Title VII.
171 Reidinger, supra note 10, at 79.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 805 F.2d at 1144. The jury also found for McClean on the discharge issue.
Id.
I1 Id. at 1145.7 I Id. at 1145-56.
177 Reidinger, supra note 10, at 79.
171 Id. No one could have expected the organized outcry generated by the order.
By early June, a coalition of 112 civic groups, 47 state attorneys general, 66 U.S.
senators, and 118 members of the House of Representatives were preparing ami-
cus briefs in defense of Runyon. Id. at 80.
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ordered the case restored to the calendar for reargument.1 7 9 Neither side
had originally raised the question that the Court ordered briefed: whether
or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 adopted by the Court
in Runyon should be reconsidered.1 80
At oral argument held last October, Patterson's attorney maintained
that Section 1981 originated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,81 which was
passed pursuant to Congress' thirteenth amendment power and was part
of a comprehensive attempt to prohibit all forms of discrimination or
other attempts to subjugate former slaves. 182 He asserted that Runyon
correctly decided that the statute reaches private acts of discrimination;
furthermore, the doctrine of stare decisis precludes the Court from over-
turning statutory precedent that is in line with society and in which
Congress had acquiesced.
183
McClean's lawyer contended that Section 1981 is a recodification of a
provision of the 1870 Enforcement Act. As such it is a fourteenth amend-
ment statute requiring state action and cannot be construed to reach
private discrimination. 8 4 He argued that by expanding the scope of Sec-
tion 1981, the Court had ignored the 1964 Civil Rights Act, thereby
allowing an employee to gain both compensatory and punitive damages,
to circumvent the role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, to sidestep Title VII's preference for conciliation, and to diminish
the role of federalism under Title VII.185 He concluded that given the
availability of remedies enacted in recent years, reversal of Runyon and
a more restricted scope for Section 1981 would have little practical im-
pact. 8
6
Reconsideration of Runyon implicates both constitutional and legal
questions: whether Congress has the thirteenth amendment authority to
reach private acts of discrimination, and whether five justices think Run-
yon is wrong enough to be overturned despite the widely agreed upon
need for stability in the law.'87 These issues of state action and stare
decisis, respectively, will be discussed in the next section. Ironically, the
original question raised by Patterson-whether Runyon covers racial ha-
rassment and discrimination in the workplace-may never be an-
swered. '88
"I Supreme Court Order Scheduling Reargument of Civil Rights Case, supra
note 1, at D-1.
180 Id.
181 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
112 57 U.S.L.W. 3292 (Oct. 25, 1988).
18' Reidinger, supra note 10, at 80.
184 Id.
'1' See supra notes 107-114 and accompanying text.
186 57 U.S.L.W. at 3292.
117 Reidinger, supra note 10, at 81.
188 Id.
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IV. LEGAL DOCTRINES
A. State Action
Section 1 of the thirteenth amendment prohibits slavery and invol-
untary servitude within the United States or any place under their ju-
risdiction.8 9 Section 2 endows Congress with the power to enforce this
prohibition by appropriate legislation. 9° Initially, the Supreme Court
interpreted Section 2 as a narrow grant of power. Although the Court
declared that the amendment authorized Congress to regulate private
conduct as well as state action,' 9' such legislation could address only
"slavery and its incidents. 19 2 The Court relied upon the long existence
of African slavery in America as providing very distinct notions of what
it was and what its necessary incidents were. 193 In "abolishing all badges
and incidents of slavery,"'194 Congress could not "adjust what may be called
the social rights of men and races in the community; but only ... declare
and vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence
of citizenship, and the enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the
essential distinction between freedom and slavery."'9 5 The Court con-
cluded that it would be running the slavery argument into the ground
to apply it to every act of discrimination which a person may make as to
the guests he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert
or theatre, or deal with in other matters of business. 9 6
Subsequent decisions further limited congressional power. 97 However,
189 An exception was made for "punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
190 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
191 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883).
1
92 Id.
193 Id. at 22.
191 Id. at 20.
195 Id. at 22, quoted in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 331 (2d. ed.
1988).
196 109 U.S. at 24-25, quoted in L. TRIBE, supra note 195, at 331-32.
197 See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (Congress may forbid
only those private acts which subjugate entirely one person to the will of another);
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (Congress cannot prohibit racially re-
strictive covenants); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (thirteenth amendment
[1866 Civil Rights Act] does not empower Congress to proscribe agreements
among whites to refuse to deal with blacks).
However, not all Supreme Court decisions during this era were hostile to
thirteenth amendment claims. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court acknowledged
that the amendment's prohibitions were "undoubtedly self-executing." 109 U.S.
at 20. Even in Hodges, the Court declared that the thirteenth amendment pro-
tected persons of all races. 203 U.S. at 16-17. In several cases, the Court invoked
the thirteenth amendment to strike down state legislation which treated breach
of a labor contract as a crime. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944);
Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
The Court also invalidated a state law allowing private employers to hire convicts
as laborers without setting any limits on the power of the employers over the
convicts. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
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in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 9 8 the Court rejected the notion that the
scope of congressional power was significantly hampered by any judicially
defined concept of slavery and declared that Congress has the power under
the thirteenth amendment to determine what are the badges and inci-
dents of slavery and the power to translate that determination into ef-
fective legislation. 199
A literal reading of Jones endows Congress with the authority to protect
individual rights under the thirteenth amendment. This authority is as
limitless as the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce.
200
It would appear that Congress is free, within the broad parameters of
reason, to recognize whatever rights it desires, to pronounce the infringe-
ment of those rights a form of domination and, hence, a manifestation of
slavery, and to proscribe the infringement as a violation of the thirteenth
amendment. Approached in this fashion, Congress would possess plenary
power under the thirteenth amendment to shield all but the most insig-
nificant rights from both governmental and private invasion.
20 1
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has had no opportunity to consider
whether Jones reaches as far as it indicates.2 12 Since the immediate post-
Civil War era, Congress has passed scant legislation relying upon the
thirteenth amendment for constitutional authorization. 20 3 Because the
Court's recent thirteenth amendment opinions involve the long-ignored
post-Civil War statutes, such as the 1866 and 1870 Acts, which are con-
cerned almost entirely with racial discrimination, they raise few issues
as to the limits of Congress' thirteenth amendment power.20 4 Rather, as
198 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
1- Id. at 440.
- L. TRIBE, supra note 195, at 332.
' o Id. at 332-33.
202 Id. at 333. Even if the Court overrules Runyon, Jones is still the law and
the question of reconsidering it is not before the Court. 57 U.S.L.W. at 3293.
203 A few lower federal courts have upheld provisions of Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 which proscribe "block-busting" and discrimination in adver-
tising as legislation enforcing the thirteenth amendment. See Note, Federal Power
to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the
Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 500 n.301 (1974). Con-
gress also passed Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pursuant, in part, to its
thirteenth amendment power. It directed that no person be excluded from, denied
the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any program receiving federal
financial assistance, because of race, color, or national origin. In 1977 Congress
took a more direct approach, by means of the minority business enterprise re-
quirement, to prevent the exclusion of minority groups from the benefits of federal
public works programs. Rhode Island Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v.
Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338, 362 n.33 (D.R.I. 1978). See also, Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980) (minority business enterprise provision of Public Works Em-
ployment Act of 1977 held constitutional); Constructors Ass'n of W. Pa. v. Kreps,
573 F.2d 811 (1978) (denial of preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of
MBE set-aside requirement). But see City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., No.
87-998 (January 23, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds Databases, SCT) (MBE plan
struck down because it was not narrowly tailored to remedy effects of prior dis-
crimination).
204 L. TRIBE, supra note 195, at 333.
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exemplified by Runyon and Patterson, the statutes create complex prob-
lems of construction considering the inherent difficulties of reconciling
ambiguous century-old legislative history with modern notions of indi-
vidual rights.20 5
Congressional power to enforce the fourteenth amendment has consis-
tently given rise to even more pronounced constitutional controversy. 20 6
This amendment recognizes several broad protections which the Supreme
Court has never defined with precision. 20 7 Because the fourteenth amend-
ment is so amenable to interpretation, it invites remedial congressional
legislation and, like the thirteenth amendment, congressional determi-
nation of the very rights themselves.20
By their terms, the due process and the equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment affect only governmental actions.209 During the
Reconstruction Era, the Supreme Court struck down much civil rights
legislation on the ground that it regulated the conduct of private indi-
viduals in addition to state action. The legislation was not authorized by
the fourteenth amendment and was therefore unconstitutional.2 10 In the
1960's when the Court undertook to re-examine the reach of congressional
power under the fourteenth amendment, a key issue was whether, under
a new theory of congressional power, Congress could subject private ac-
tions to fourteenth amendment restrictions. 211
In two decisions, the Supreme Court intimated that Congress has the
authority to regulate at least some private conduct under the fourteenth
amendment. 212 Although the Court has recently had no occasion to con-
sider the limits of the state action requirement on congressional power
to enforce the fourteenth amendment, it seems fairly clear that congres-
sional power exists to reach private conduct.2 12 Congress could reasonably
adopt the view that the states have an affirmative obligation to regulate
certain forms of private conduct and that, where the states fail or refuse
to do so, Congress could impose its own regulation under the fourteenth
amendment. 21
4
205 Id.
206 1d. at 340.
207 These include, of course, due process and equal protection. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
208 L. TRIBE, supra note 195, at 340.
1091 d. at 350-51.
21OThe Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.
629 (1883).
21 L_ TRIBE, supra note 195, at 351.
212 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (fourteenth amendment
erects no shield against private conduct); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745(1966) (Congress is fully empowered to punish private conspiracies).
213 Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (certain
rights guaranteed by fourteenth amendment were protected against interference
by private action).
214 L. TRiBE, supra note 195, at 352, citing Michelman, The Supreme Court and
Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part II, 1974 DUKE
L.J. 527, 568-70. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW ch. 12 (3d ed. 1986).
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The standard for judicial review of the regulation adopted by Congress
to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery is given by the thirteenth
amendment itself: appropriateness. 215 The Supreme Court appears to treat
this standard as one of minimum rationality, similar to the rational basis
test enunciated in McCulloch v. Maryland.2" 6 However, when the means
adopted include racial classification, a higher level of scrutiny is re-
quired. 2 7 Because of the historic relationship between the thirteenth
amendment and race, and because the fourteenth amendment was in-
tended to expand, not contract, congressional power,218 the stricter stand-
ard of review should be developed from the nature of the thirteenth
amendment.219
The thirteenth amendment makes the elimination of a badge or inci-
dent of slavery per se a compelling state interest.220 Congressional action
under this amendment aims at the elimination of a general, pervasive,
and historical discrimination resulting from slavery; accordingly, Con-
gress can attack discrimination in any number of ways, including the
enactment of Section 1981 and its predecessors. 22' The contract rights
protected by Section 1981 would therefore derive from the thirteenth
amendment, not from an implied or express provision in a private agree-
ment between two parties.222
Traditionally, the tests developed by the Court in the determination of
state action focused on whether sufficient state connections to a particular
activity do, or do not, exist. 2 ' However, the fourteenth amendment does
not require the judiciary to determine whether a state has acted, but
whether a state has deprived someone of a guaranteed right.224 In many
instances, the state has acted to establish a priority between two con-
flicting private rights by legalizing or, at least, not outlawing a challenged
practice in the state. 25 If the value of a right protected by the fourteenth
amendment clearly outweighs the value of the challenged practice, the
amendment proscribes the practice and the state has deprived the plaintiff
of a guaranteed right by its failure to shield the right from the impact
of the practice. 2 6
215 Rhode Island Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp.
338, 365 (D.R.I. 1978).
216 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819).
217 450 F. Supp. at 365.
218 Id., citing to Broek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 171, 200-202 (1951). In fact, part of the motivation
underlying congressional support of the fourteenth amendment was to erase any
doubts about the constitutionality of the 1866 Act. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968).
219 450 F. Supp. at 365.
2 2 0 Id.
221 Id.
2 22 Partin v. St. Johnsbury Co., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1297, 1300 (1978).
22- J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 214, at 448.
224 Id. at 449.
225 Id.
226Id.
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Utilizing this approach, 2 7 it may be argued that Section 1981 reaches
private acts of racial discrimination even if the Court overrules Runyon
and declares Section 1981 a fourteenth amendment statute requiring
state action. The right to be free from employment-related racial dis-
crimination, with its catastrophic economic and social consequences,
surely outweighs the important but less relevant rights to association
and of privacy.228
B. Stare Decisis
The doctrine of stare decisis-adherence to decided cases-formed a
fundamental basis for the majority and concurring opinions in Runyon.229
Stare decisis counsels even more strongly now than it did thirteen years
ago against overturning this crucial statutory precedent.230 If Runyon
were to be overruled, it would demonstrate that "stare decisis seemingly
operates with the randomness of a lightning bolt: on occasion it may
strike, but when and where can be known only after the fact.' '231
While it is true that a single decision has never been considered ab-
solutely binding in all events, 232 nothing less than an overriding convic-
tion that a precept established by an earlier decision contradicted the
principles of the law so that it had an adverse effect upon the process of
determining new questions by analogical reasoning and produced flatly
unjust results, could justify judicial rejection. 23 For stare decisis to be
discarded, there must be special justification,234 because only the most
compelling circumstances can vindicate abandonment by the Supreme
Court of firmly established statutory precedent.
Whether or not Runyon was correctly decided, given the complicated
227 Another approach is the severabilty of Section 1981's contract clause from
its equal benefits clause and like punishment clause. The right to make and
enforce contracts can be infringed by private individuals and it is proper that
they be held liable. Conversely, the other clauses of Section 1981 concern the
state, which is the sole source of law, so governmental action would be necessary.Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1029-30 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
904 (1978).
223 Runyon held that certain personal choices that are not part of a commercial
relationship that is offered generally or widely were not intended to be within
the scope of the statute. 427 U.S. at 187 (Powell, J., concurring). Thus, minority
nonshareholder employees who alleged discrimination by their employer stated
a valid claim under Section 1981. Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d1297 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984). By their very nature,
employment situations are less personal and more likely to be offered to thegeneral public than those involving private schools and clubs. See generally Du-gan, Civil Rights and Freedom of Contract: Employment, Housing and CreditTransactions (Part I-Employment), 26 S.D.L. REV. 259 (1981); Note, Section 1981
and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom from Discrimi-
nation, 84 YALE L.J. 1441 (19.75).
22 427 U.S. at 168-70, 186, and 190-91.
230 Overrule Runyon?, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1988, at 39.21 Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
723, 743 (1988).
22 Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6 (1941).233 Id.
' Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
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and even ambiguous legislative history of Section 1981, it did not hamper
subsequent legal reasoning,23 5 nor did it effect "flatly unjust" results.
Runyon's acknowledgement of a constitutional and statutory right to be
free from private racial discrimination can hardly be termed unjust.236
If the Supreme Court, upon reconsideration, were to rule that Section
1981 is a fourteenth amendment statute requiring state action and there-
fore does not reach private acts of discrimination, it would not rectify an
error so egregious as it has in other cases. 237 The circumstances of any
error in Runyon are not the most compelling. Rather, the Court's inter-
pretation of Section 1981 and other federal civil rights legislation is an
area that has received "careful, intense and sustained congressional at-
tention."23
8
The criteria for gaging compelling circumstances are provided in Run-
yon itself:
[W]hen a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has
been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with
the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank
avowal and full abandonment... If judges have woefully mis-
interpreted the mores of their day, or if the mores of their day
are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in helpless
submission, the hands of their successors.
239
In the exceptional case, those admonitions favor departure from precedent
and allow the Court the flexibility to confront significant developments
as needed. However, the policy of the nation as formulated by Congress
in recent .years has consistently promoted the elimination of racial dis-
crimination in all sectors of society.24 Patterson is not an exceptional
case, and adherence to Runyon is favored.
Judicial adherence to precedent furthers certain values in decision-
making: consistency, coherence, fairness, equality, predictability, and ef-
ficiency.241 At its most basic level, stare decisis encourages systemwide
stability and continuity by ensuring the survival of governmental norms
which have achieved unsurpassed importance in American life.242 One
such norm is the freedom from racial discrimination. Both tangible and
symbolic expectations have materialized around critical Court decisions,
Runyon included; the massive destablization resulting from a successful
attack on this or other norms would endanger the functioning of the
federal government, if not the viability of the constitutional order itself.
243
235 See supra Part III.B., for a discussion of reliance on Runyon.
26 Overrule Runyon?, supra note 230, at 39.
-1 E.g., Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (repudiating "separate but
equal" doctrine).
11 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424
(1986).
29 427 U.S. at 191, quoting B. CARDozo, supra note 154, at 150-52.
240 427 U.S. at 191.
'A1 Monaghan, supra note 231, at 749.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 750.
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V. NATIONAL CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY: BACK TO THE FUTURE?
Advocates who urge that the Supreme Court overrule Runyon present
two arguments. The first concerns forced contracting. Stripped of all rhet-
oric, Runyon held that members of racial or other protected classes may
coerce private individuals into contractual arrangements they do not wish
to enter.244 Although the principle that contracts are private and presup-
pose mutually assenting parties is not sacrosanct, it deserves substantive
consideration before being discarded and replaced by the determination
in Runyon that a public policy of nondiscrimination necessitates intrusive
restraints on private conduct.245 The feared "inevitable result" of such a
sweeping application of Runyon is that "there will be a section 1981 action
in federal court whenever a white man strikes a black man in a barroom
brawl ."246
The second argument advanced by opponents of Runyon is that the
decision permits plaintiffs to circumvent the comprehensive federal stat-
utory scheme created by Congress in recent years to fight racial discrim-
ination. Congress struck a reasonable and widely accepted balance
between contractual freedom and antidiscrimination policy in Title VII
and other similar laws. 247 Scores of plaintiffs have brought Section 1981
suits to redress acts of discrimination covered by Title VII, or appended
Section 1981 claims to Title VII complaints, because the potential rem-
edies can make it worth their while.248
The punitive damages awarded in these cases can amount to several
times the compensatory damages. 249 Some plaintiffs have collected for
mental distress; others have won back pay awards above the limits au-
thorized by Title VII.250 Were Section 1981 to become an integral part of
the tort litigation explosion, it would not be an instrument of a coherent
civil rights olicy but "an entry ticket to a lottery with windfall settle-
ments or judgments.1251 The costs could be considerable both to the Amer-
ican free enterprise system and to minorities who would not be hired
because prospective employers and contractors fear the expensive liability
posed by a Section 1981 lawsuit. 25 2
Supporters of Runyon emphasize the important policy goals the opinion
serves because Section 1981 covers things which Title VII does not.253 It
reaches small employers, provides for punitive and compensatory dam-
ages, grants the right to a trial by jury, and offers a longer statute of
24 Overrule Runyon?, supra note 230, at 38.
2 45 Id.
246 Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1029 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 904 (1978).
247 For example, Congress excluded employers with less than 15 employees
from Title VII, but made it easier to prove discrimination under Title VII than
Section 1981. Overrule Runyon?, supra note 230, at 38.248 Id.
24 9
Id.
250Id.
251 Id.
212 Overrule Runyon?, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1988 at 38.
11 Reidinger, supra note 10, at 81.
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limitations and immediate access to the courts. 54
Section 1981, as interpreted by the Court in Runyon and its progeny,
protects groups which are racially "identifiable '25 5 and hence, more vul-
nerable to bigotry than whites. Employment discrimination robs these
groups of billions of dollars annually.2 6 "It robs the American economy,
holds down the gross national product (GNP), and further reduces the
maximum utilization of goods and services of Americans. The contin-
uation of these insidious practices further compounds the poverty cycle
and adds millions of poor blacks and whites to welfare rolls.
257
Prior to 1941, employment opportunities for blacks in particular were
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. 258 Many blacks were employed in
the very lowest level jobs and remained there without promotion until
retirement.2 5 9 The years following World War II witnessed the passage
of a plethora of executive orders, civil rights acts and related laws, and
the judicial strengthening of Reconstruction Era legislation, including
Section 1981.260 Until last April, the Supreme Court continually endorsed
Runyon's interpretation that Section 1981 reaches private conduct, and
Congress has not reconsidered its position on this matter.
2 1 '
The Court's unilateral decision to reconsider Runyon surely under-
mines the faith of victims of racial discrimination in a stable construction
of civil rights laws, and harms the public's perception of the Court as an
impartial adjudicator of cases and controversies. 26 2 Time alone will tell
whether the Court's actions will return discriminatees to their pre-1941
status and chart a course for national civil rights policy back to the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent controversial announcement by the Supreme Court that it
would reconsider its holding in Runyon v. McCrary has called into ques-
tion an area of law thought well-settled. Runyon held that 42 U.S.C.
Section 1981 reaches private acts of discrimination against blacks and
other racially identifiable groups. Courts subsequently relied on Runyon
to define the origin and application of Section 1981 to employment dis-
crimination claims and its complementary relation to Title VII.
The constitutional and legal issues of state action and stare decisis are
implicated by the Court's announcement, and suggest that, Section 1981's
ambiguous legislative history notwithstanding, Runyon should be upheld.
Reversal of the decision could ultimately impair the status of minorities,
undermine confidence in the Court, and spell disaster for the American
ideal of equal employment opportunity for all.
BARBARA L. KRAMER
254 Id. See also Part II.C. and D. supra.
215 St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
216 F. KORNEGAY, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT: MANDATE AND CHALLENGE 273 (1979).
257 Id.
258 Id. at 28.
259 Id.
260 See id., ch. II.
261 Patterson, 485 U.S. at 617.
262 Id.
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